The sovereign bill has come due
Governments face a growing fiscal bill, and savers may end up footing it.
Governments face a growing fiscal bill, and savers may end up footing it.

In brief
This trend is reaching its limits. Debt is higher, borrowing costs have risen and spending pressures are becoming structural. Ageing populations, defence, the energy transition and industrial policy are adding to budgets that were already in deficit. The sovereign bill is no longer deferred: it has come due. Current estimates put US borrowing near 38% of global savings[1].
The fiscal challenge: more claims, less headroom
The problem is not simply the stock of debt. What matters is the interaction between borrowing costs, economic growth and the primary balance, the difference between revenues and non-interest spending. A country can function with high debt if nominal growth – the economy’s growth including inflation – exceeds the interest rate paid on that debt. But when that relationship reverses, stabilisation requires a stronger primary balance: higher revenue, slower spending, or both. And the adjustment becomes harder as debt rolls over at current high yields.
The adjustment is made more difficult by the nature of public spending. Interest payments cannot easily be reduced. Age-related expenditure is politically difficult to reform. Defence and climate investment are becoming strategic priorities rather than discretionary choices. As these commitments absorb a larger share of revenue, the part of the budget that governments can realistically change shrinks.
Competing with AI for capital
At the same time, governments are no longer the only large borrowers competing for capital. The AI build-out requires enormous investment in chips, data centres, electricity generation and grids. Governments and companies are therefore drawing on the same pool of global savings. If that pool does not expand fast enough, the price of capital must rise, weaker borrowers must retreat or governments must find ways to direct savings towards themselves.
Who buys the debt matters. The Federal Reserve and foreign official institutions are relatively patient investors, but their footprint has declined, while domestic and foreign private investors have expanded. These buyers respond more directly to valuation, inflation and fiscal policy, making yields increasingly sensitive to market sentiment. Foreign investors may also reduce exposure when fiscal or political risk rises, putting simultaneous pressure on bond yields and the currency.
The objective: create space without killing growth
Fiscal consolidation, reducing deficits through spending restraint, higher revenue or both, is unavoidable, but its design matters as much as its size. Tightening too quickly can weaken activity, reduce tax receipts and make debt ratios harder to stabilise. Doing nothing leaves governments more exposed to the next downturn and gives markets greater control over the timing of the adjustment.
The aim should not be austerity for its own sake. It should be to slow day-to-day state spending while protecting investment that raises productive capacity. Pension reform, better-targeted transfers and credible spending ceilings can deliver savings gradually. Where tax revenue is persistently too low, taxing a wider range of income and activity, rather than raising rates ever higher, can also help.
Why savers may end up paying
The sovereign bill will be paid through reform, taxation, inflation, financial repression or higher borrowing costs. The real question is not whether it will be paid, but how, when and by whom.
If governments cannot restore fiscal credibility through spending and tax reform, they may turn increasingly towards financial repression. Banks, insurers and pension funds can be encouraged, or required through regulation, to hold more sovereign debt. Central banks may face pressure to limit sharp increases in yields, while inflation and regulated demand keep the government’s effective borrowing cost below nominal growth.
This can make the debt more manageable, but it does not make the cost disappear. It shifts the burden towards savers, reduces returns on safe assets (government bonds, cash) and can crowd out financing for private investment, including the AI infrastructure on which future productivity growth may depend.
Valentin Bissat, Head of Macro & Asset Allocation at Mirabaud Wealth Management
Next chapter – The AI bill: built before it pays Return to Investment View 2027
[1] US Treasury, Federal Reserve, BEA, IMF, Mirabaud calculations. Data as of end 2025.